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Abstract
The objective of this paper is to give the prospective outcome or
"prospect" of a negotiation when the players’ value can only be realized if
a certain threshold is reached. Thresholds can be of different forms such
as a certain number of players, a certain coalition of players or a certain
total level of contribution. A value is proposed, which is defined for a
given game and a given threshold. It is derived from a decomposition of
the Shapley value.
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1 Introduction
Think of a group of partners who wish to invest in a project. They meet around
a table to discuss the total amount of money they need to realize this project and
the individual contribution that each of them should make. However, whatever
the result of this discussion, the different participants are not able to put their
contributions on the table at the end of the meeting. Each one goes back
home and the day after starts to raise the money required through a credit or
disaving. However, for some or all of the partners the project is only attractive
if certain conditions are fulfilled: a minimum amount of money must be raised,
certain key-partners must participate. Therefore, the group has to negotiate a
conditional outcome, a sharing of the amount of money needed, which will only
be implemented if the conditions are fulfilled. The partners may be satisfied by
this conditional outcome: they will be willing to participate if the conditions are
fulfilled and they will not be obliged to participate if the conditions are not met.
However, it may be that other partners, who are more involved in the project,
would like to ensure that these conditions will be fulfilled. In this situation, the
result of the negotiation will certainly depend on the partners’ different levels
of involvement.
What sort of theoretical tools can we use to analyse this sort of procedure?
Clearly, the problem is to analyse the ex-ante effect of a threshold on the result of
a negotiation. There is a large literature on thresholds using a game theoretical
and experimental approach. Thresholds are often invoked in the literature on
games of contribution to a public good, for example. It is argued there that they
are incentive compatible (cf. Bagnoli and Lipman (1989), Palfrey and Rosenthal
(1984)).
A first problem concerns the definition of thresholds. In the voluntary con-
tribution to a public good literature, the threshold is defined as a minimum level
of contributions. However, in many real economic situations the contribution to
a public good and the threshold are not defined in monetary terms. Consider
the example of international environmental agreements. After the agreement
has been defined and signed, the different signatories have to ratify the treaty.
The ratification phase is then governed by a minimum participation constraint
which plays the role of a threshold. Depending on the treaty in question, this
threshold is defined in very different ways: as a set of countries, a number of
countries or a percentage of the targeted polluting substances (cf Barret (2003)
pages 165-195).
Another problem is that, in this literature, the focus is on the problem of effi-
ciency in a non-cooperative framework. When a certain "level" of contributions
is needed to provide a public good, at the equilibrium of the game of private
contribution, the "sum" of contributions is efficient. However, can we say some-
thing about the distribution of these contributions amoung the participants and
can they be asymmetric?
It is often useful to adopt a cooperative approach to deal with asymmetries.
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Cooperative game theory proposes alternative tools, solution concepts, to share
a value or a cost based on different principles. For example, the Shapley value is
based on the principle that each player is rewarded according to her incremental
worth, that is, to her contribution to the worth of a given coalition. Then, for a
given player, her Shapley value is her expected incremental contribution, when
it is assumed that the different orders in which the partners join the coalition
are equally probable. It has been argued that the Shapley value allows one
"to evaluate the players’ prospects"- Hart and Kurz (1983) p1047. Let me also
quote Shapley (1953 p. 307):
"At the foundation of the theory of games is the assumption that the players
of a game can evaluate, in their utility scales, every "prospect" that might
arise as a result of a play. In attempting to apply the theory to any field, one
would normally expect to be permitted to include, in the class of "prospects,"
the prospect of having to play a game. The possibility of evaluating games is
therefore of critical importance."
The idea that a value can be interpreted as the expected outcome of a nego-
tiation has been also explicitly developed by Hart and Kurz (1983). However,
they kept a purely cooperative and axiomatic approach in their definition of
the CS-value (coalition structure value) that they propose. Later on, the non
cooperative literature has proposed different ways of proving what was originaly
just an interpretation (see for example Perez-Castrillo and Wettstein (2001) or
Maskin (2004)). Indeed empirical studies had already corroborated this inter-
pretation (see for example Littlechild and Thompson (1979)). In this paper, we
will not try to propose a non-cooperative game to describe the negotiation. We
will adopt the cooperative approach but we will keep in mind the interpretation
that the value corresponds to an evaluation of players’ prospects.
Another important point about this interpretation of the Shapley value,
concerns the weights of the different players in the negotiation. The value is
defined for a given game v which represents the contribution of each coalition
and v (N) , with N a arrier of the game, is then the amount the players have
to share. However, v cannot represent all the elements which could play a
role in the negotiation. These elements are incorporated in the weights that
the different players have in the negotiation. Kalai and Samet (1988) say that:
"The weights should be determined by considering such factors as bargaining
ability, patience rates, or past experiences". In the Shapley value, everything is
considered to be incorporated in the game v and these weights are symmetric.
However, Shapley (1953) also introduced the concept of a family of Shapley
values which has generated an extensive literature. Kalai and Samet (1988)
have proposed an axiomatic characterization of the family of Shapley values.
A weighted Shapley value is defined for a given, ordered, coalition structure
and a vector of exogeneous weights. Yet, the underlying common feature of
the different weighted Shapley values which satisfy Kalai and Samet’s Axioms
does not necessarily exhaust all the possible ways in which weights can be used.
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Indeed, Hart and Kurz (1983) have proposed a value which does not satisfy
these Axioms. However, Hart and Kurz’s coalition structure value intuitively
represents the Shapley value players can expect when they form coalitions:
"Our view is that the reason coalitions form is not in order to get their
worth, but to be in a better position when bargaining with the others on how
to divide the maximal amount available." (p. 1052)
The coalition structure modifies the different players’ weights in the negoti-
ation and the resultant sharing of v (N) in comparison with the Shapley value.
But contrary to what is required for a weighted Shapley value, here the coali-
tion structure is not ordered. As in the case of the weighted Shapley value, the
coalition structure modifies the probability of the different orders defined on the
set of players. But in their definition of the Coalition Structure value, Hart and
Kurz (1983) do not need to order the different coalitions. They assume that,
the only orders to appear are orders consistent with the coalition structure: the
orders in which the coalitions appear as blocks.
In this paper, I propose a value for a given threshold. A threshold can be
represented by a coalition but in a general framework could be a set of coalitions
which can reach the threshold. The problem I want to address concerns the
delicate situations in which players do not know, at the moment at which they
have to negotiate, which coalition will actually form. They only know, through
the threshold rule, which coalitions may form.
The threshold value (T-value) I am going to propose, which is defined for
any game and for any given threshold is derived from a decomposition of the
Shapley value. By comparing the T-value with the Shapley value, I show how
the threshold can distort the sharing rule in favour of some players and at the
expense of others.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces a decomposition of
the Shapley value which is used in Section 3 where the threshold value is pre-
sented for a specific definition of thresholds. It comes with a heuristic description
and an axiomatization. I will also discuss in this section, the relationship between
this value, the family of weighted Shapley value (Kalai and Samet (1988)) and
the CS-value proposed by Hart and Kurz (1983). The properties of the value are
then analysed in the last section when the definition of thresholds is generalized.
I give examples of what I call neutral and non neutral thresholds.
2 A decomposition of the Shapley value
In this section, both well known and new concepts and results will be presented
and these will be used in the following section. Let U denote the universe of
players. A coalition of players is a subset S ⊂ U. A game v is a function which
associates a real number v (S) to each coalition S ⊂ U , v(S) represents the
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total payoff or worth the coalition S can get in game v. I will only consider
games which are superadditive, that is, for two disjoint coalitions S and T ⊂ U ,
v (S)+v (T ) ≤ v (S ∪ T ). The incremental worth of player i to coalition S, i /∈ S,
is v(S ∪ {i})− v(S). Players i, j are said to be symmetric with respect to game
v if they make the same incremental worth to any coalition, i.e., for each S ⊂ U
with i, j /∈ S, v(S∪{i}) = v(S∪{j}). A finite carrier of v is any set N ⊆ U with
v(S) = v(N ∩ S) for all S ⊆ U . A dummy player in game v is a player i whose
incremental worth to each coalition is zero, i.e., v(S ∪ {i})− v(S) = 0 for every
S ⊂ U . Therefore, if N is a finite carrier of v, all players in U\N are dummies.
A value is an operator ϕ that assigns to each game v and each player i in U a
payoff ϕi(v). The Shapley value is characterized by three very simple axioms.
Axiom 1 Efficiency. For each finite carrier N of v,∑
i∈N
ϕi (v) = v(N)
Axiom 2 Additivity. For any two games v and u, ϕi (v + u) = ϕi (v) + ϕi (u)
Axiom 3 Symmetry. If players i, j are symmetric with respect to game v, then
ϕi (v) = ϕj (v) .
The Shapley value for player i in game v can be calculated as her expected
incremental value over all possible orders defined on any given carrier N of
v, under the assumption that each order appears with the same probability.
Denote by R (N) the set of all possible orders defined on N . In a given order
r ∈ R (N) each player i ∈ N is associated with a ranking ri. Consider the
coalition of all the players who have a ranking at most as high as i in this
specific order: S = {j : rj ≤ ri}. Then, in order r, player i’s incremental worth
is v (S)− v (S\i) . Note that, for notational convenience I will sometimes write
singleton {i} just as i. If all the orders inR (N) are considered to be equiprobable
the expected incremental value of player i is her Shapley value:
ϕi (v) =
∑
S⊂N,i∈S (s− 1)! (n− s)! (v (S)− v (S\i))
n!
Now, for each coalition M ⊂ N , which is not a carrier of v, we can define a
M-game vM for which M is a carrier:
vM(S) = v(S), S ⊂M
vM(S) = v(S ∩M) otherwise
Then, given r (M) the set of all possible orders on M , the Shapley value of vM
is for each i in M :
ϕi
(
vM
)
=
∑
S⊂N,i∈S (s− 1)! (m− s)!
(
vM (S)− vM (S\i)
)
m!
=
∑
S⊂M,i∈S (s− 1)! (m− s)! (v (S)− v (S\i))
m!
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This can be interpreted as the value obtained by the members of coalition M,
when they share v (M) without taking into account the players who are not in
M . Now, for each game vM , we define what we call an incremental game vM∗
as follows. For each given coalition M ⊂ U , vM∗ gives the incremental worth of
each subset S of M to N\M , where N is any carrier of v:
∀S ⊂M,vM∗ (S) = v((N\M) ∪ S)− v (N\M)
Note that, if M is a carrier of game v, N\M is a coalition of dummies and
vM∗(S) = v(S). In general however, since the game is superadditive, vM∗ (S) ≥
v(S). The Shapley value for game vM∗ and each player i in M is, for each
carrier N of v:
ϕi
(
vM∗
)
=
∑
S⊂M,i∈S (s− 1)! (m− s)!
(
vM∗ (S)− vM∗ (S\{i})
)
m!
=
∑
S⊂M,i∈S (s− 1)! (m− s)! (v (S ∪ (N\M))− v (S\{i} ∪ (N\M)))
m!
This can be interpreted as the value obtained by the members of coalition
M, when they share v (N) − v (N\M), which can be called, by extension, the
incremental worth of coalition M. In other words, this is the value which is
calculated for each M-member, assuming that a coalition N\M got its worth
v(N\M) already and taking into account all possible orders of players inM when
they join the coalition N\M . Of course, if M is a carrier of v, ϕi
(
vM∗
)
≡ ϕi (v),
the Shapley value of player i in the game v.
Example 1 An obvious case is that in which M is a singleton {i}. Then,
ϕi
(
v{i}
)
= v ({i}) and ϕi
(
v{i}∗
)
= v (N)− v (N\ {i}) is player i’s incremental
worth to N, a carrier of the game.
Example 2 Let N = {1, 2, 3, 4}. Then,
ϕ1
(
v{1,2}
)
=
v ({1}) + v ({1, 2})− v ({2})
2!
and ϕ3
(
v{3,4}∗
)
=
v ({1, 2, 3})− v ({1, 2}) + v (N)− v (N\{3})
2!
Example 3 Let N = {1, 2, 3} and ϕi
(
v{i}
)
= v ({i}),
ϕi
(
v{i,j}∗
)
=
v (N)− v (N\{i}) + v ({i, k})− v ({k})
2!
.
Note that, we can write in this case:
ϕi
(
v{i}
)
+ ϕi
(
v{i,j}∗
)
+ ϕi
(
v{i,k}∗
)
=
2v ({i}) + 2 (v (N)− v (N\{i})) + v ({i, k})− v ({k}) + v ({i, j})− v ({j})
2!
= 3ϕi (v)
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Now, if we consider ϕi
(
v{i}∗
)
= v(N)−v (N\ {i}) and ϕi
(
v{ij}
)
= v(ij)−v(j)+v({i})2! ,
we can also write:
ϕi
(
v{i}∗
)
+ ϕi
(
v{i,j}
)
+ ϕi
(
v{i,k}
)
=
2v ({i}) + 2 (v (N)− v (N\{i})) + v ({i, k})− v ({k}) + v ({i, j})− v ({j})
2!
= 3ϕi (v)
The following Proposition shows that indeed, there is a general relationship
between the Shapley value for a game v, characterized for any carrier N of v
and the Shapley values for games vM and vM∗ in which M is not a carrier of v.
For each carrier N of v, we denote by Cm the class of coalitions M ⊂ N, of the
same size m:
Cm = {M ⊂ N : #M =m}
We can prove the following relationship:
Proposition 1 For each carrier N of v and each given class Cm, 1 ≤m ≤ n:
ϕi (v) =
m!(n−m)!
n!

 ∑
M∈Cm
i∈M
ϕi
(
vM
)
+
∑
M∈Cm
i/∈M
ϕi
(
vN\M∗
)
Proof. cf Appendix.
3 The T -value for a given coalition
In this Section, I propose a value for a given game v and a given threshold. I
will consider that a threshold is simply a coalition T ⊂ U, which is not a carrier
of v but satisfies a specific condition: the sharing of v(N) with N any carrier
of v, can only be implemented if the T -members are involved. A T−value of a
game v with a threshold T is then an operator that assigns to each player i in U
a payoff φi (v, T ). The T−value, like the Shapley value, is efficient. The players
efficiently share v (N) . But now, in each order, v (N) is split between the worth
realized by the first coalition to reach the threshold, let us say coalition S which
is such that T ⊂ S, and the incremental worth of the remaining coalition N\S.
In the following sub-section, I give a heuristic description of a mechanism which
would produce the T−value of a game v as the expected outcome.
3.1 Heuristic approach
Following the usual heuristic description of the Shapley value, players have to
meet in a bargaining room to share the worth of the grand coalition. They
arrive sequentially and the order in which they do so is determined by chance,
with all arrival orders equally probable. Each player, when she enters the room,
7
demands and is promised the amount which her participation contributes to the
worth of the grand coalition.
Here, I modify this description by introducing two rooms: the waiting room
and the bargaining room. The participants arrive sequentially and in a random
order in the waiting room. But there is nothing to share before the coalition
formed by the players in the waiting room has reached the threshold. When the
last player necessary to reach this threshold enters the waiting room, the door
is closed from outside and the usual process is followed by the present players.
Players arrive sequentially and in a random order in the bargaining room. Each
player from the waiting room, when she enters the bargaining room, demands
and is promised the amount which her participation contributes to the worth of
the coalition. For each coalition S which reaches the threshold, the value ϕi
(
vS
)
represents what player i ∈ S can obtain in this negotiation.
When the waiting room is empty again, its outside door is reopened and the
remaining players arrive sequentially and go straight to the bargaining room in
order to demand the amount which their adherence contributes to the worth of
the grand coalition. For each coalition S which reaches the threshold and to
which player i does not belong, the value ϕi
(
vN\S∗
)
represents what player i
can obtain in this negotiation.
3.2 Definitions
For each carrier N of v, consider the set ΘT = {S ⊂ N : T ⊂ S}, this is the
set of coalitions which satisfy threshold T . We will say that player i ∈ N is
necessary for the threshold to be reached if i ∈ T . A symmetric game vK , is
defined, for a given coalition K ⊂ U, as follows:
vK (S) = 1 if K ⊂ S
= 0 otherwise
In what follows, I give a probabilistic interpretation of thresholds. Remember
that r (N) is an order defined on the set of players and for a given order r(N),
each player i is associated with a ranking ri. For a given threshold T ⊂ N
and a given order r(N), consider the coalitions S ⊂ N, which satisfy the three
following conditions:
(i) S ∈ ΘT
(ii) All the players who belong to coalition S arrive successively in r(N):
given i ∈ S, such that ri = Mink∈Srk and j ∈ S such that rj = Maxk∈Srk,
∀k ∈ S, rj ≥ rk ≥ ri. In other words, think about S as a block in the order
r(N).
(iii) One of the S-members arrives first in the order. In other words
ri =Mink∈Srk = 1.
For a given threshold T ⊂ N , to each order r(N) corresponds a unique
coalition S, which satisfies the three previous conditions and has the smallest
number of members. But each coalition S may correspond to several orders.
This defines an injective but not surjective application from the set of orders
8
r (S) to the set of coalitions Θ. Denote by αS the number of orders associated
with coalition S, αS = (n− s)! (s− 1)!t : this is the number of orders in which
the S-members all arrive before the others, but among them the last to arrive is
a T -member. In other words, in the order r (N) , the threshold is reached when
the last T -member has arrived and all the players who have a smaller ranking
constitute coalition S, associated with this order. Note that as a consequence
of the injective application, we have:
∑
S∈ΘT αS = n!
3.3 Axiomatization
I will now argue that the following function can be considered as an expected
Shapley value:
Consider N , any finite carrier of v, and a threshold T ⊂ N ,
φi (v, T ) =
∑
S∈ΘT ,i∈S αSϕi
(
vS
)
+
∑
S∈ΘT ,i/∈S αSϕi
(
vN\S∗
)
n!
,∀i ∈ N\T(1)
φi (v, T ) =
∑
S∈ΘT ,i∈S αSϕi
(
vS
)
n!
,∀i ∈ T (2)
where αS = (n− s)! (s− 1)!t, and ϕi
(
vS
)
and ϕi
(
vN\S∗
)
are defined in the
previous section. This function is obtained using the probabilistic description of
thresholds presented in sub-section 3.2. Consider a given threshold T . For each
order r (N) , the associated coalition S is the set of players who first reach the
threshold T and the Shapley value is applied to this set of players. Then, in order
to share v (N)−v (S) among the N\S other players, the Shapley value is applied
to the incremental game vN\S∗. The previous function is therefore an expected
Shapley value. Note that when T is a carrier of v, we can write ΘT = {T}
and αT = (t− 1)!t = t!. Therefore, when T is a carrier of v, φi (v, T ) = ϕi (v).
For notational convenience I may write, for a given coalition M , φM (v, T ) for∑
i∈M φi (v, T )and ϕM (v, T ) for
∑
i∈M ϕi (v, T ).
Consider the following Axioms defined for any function φ (v, T ), with T ⊂
N,N any carrier of v.
Axiom 4 Efficiency*. For each finite carrier N of v,∑
i∈N
φi (v, T ) = v (N)
Axiom 5 Additivity*. For any two games v and u:
φi (v + u, T ) = φi (v, T ) + φi (u, T )
Axiom 6 Symmetry*. If players i, j are symmetric with respect to v and i, j ∈
T or i, j /∈ T , then
φi (v, T ) = φj (v, T )
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Axiom 7 Commitment cost. For any symmetric game vK,
φT (vK , T ) =
t
k
φT (vK ,K)
Note that φi (vK ,K) is the function defined for a threshold K that is a carrier
of a symmetric game. In that case, as noted above φi (vK ,K) = ϕi (v) =
1
k .
Taking this case as a benchmark, the Commitment cost Axiom shows how the
threshold modifies the value in a symmetric game. In a symmetric game vK ,
all the players in K are necessary to realize a worth. In that case, when there
is no threshold, the value gives to each of the k players an equal share of v(K).
Then, when the threshold is introduced, the Axiom says that the players who
are necessary for the threshold to be reached only receive a proportion tk of what
they have without the threshold. An intuitive interpretation of this Axiom is
that the players who are necessary for the threshold to be reached are committed
to the sharing, while the others are not. All the players in K will participate
in negotiating the sharing of v(K), but the players who are necessary for the
threshold to be reached have a leadership commitment. They will initiate the
sharing process and the cost of this is that they will be restricted to sharing the
worth of the coalition which has been necessary to reach the threshold v(N\M),
whilst the remaining players can share the incremental worth v(N)− v(M).
Theorem 1 There is a unique value which satisfies Efficiency*, Additivity*,
Symmetry* and Commitment cost and it is defined by Equalities (1) and (2).
Proof. First step: I prove that the function defined by Equalities (1) and
(2)satisfies the four Axioms.
(i) It is efficient. Sum the values of the function over a finite carrier N :
∑
i∈N
φi (v, T ) =
∑
i∈N
∑
S∈ΘT ,i∈S αSϕi
(
vS
)
+
∑
S∈ΘT ,i/∈S αSϕi
(
vN\S∗
)
n!
=
∑
S∈ΘT
[∑
i∈S αSϕi
(
vS
)
+
∑
i/∈S αSϕi
(
vN\S∗
)]
n!
=
∑
S∈ΘT αS [v (S) + (v (N)− v (S))]
n!
=
v(N)
∑
S∈ΘT αS
n!
= v (N)
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(ii) The function defined by Equalities (1) and (2) satisfies Additivity*:
φi (w + u, T ) =
∑
S∈ΘT ,i∈S αSϕi
(
(w + u)S
)
+
∑
S∈ΘT ,i/∈S αSϕi
(
(w + u)N\S∗
)
n!
=
∑
S∈ΘT ,i∈S αSϕi
(
wS + uS
)
+
∑
S∈ΘT ,i/∈S αS
[
ϕi
(
wN\S∗ + uN\S∗
)]
n!
=
∑
S∈ΘT ,i∈S αS
[
ϕi
(
wS
)
+ ϕi
(
uS
)]
+∑
S∈ΘT ,i/∈S αS
[
ϕi
(
wN\S∗
)
+ ϕi
(
uN\S∗
)]
n!
= φi (w, T ) + φi (u, T )
(iii) As a direct consequence of Symmetry of the Shapley value, the
function defined by Equalities (1) and (2) satisfies the Symmetry defined in
Axiom 6.
(iiii) The function defined by Equalities (1) and (2) satisfies Commit-
ment cost. Consider a unanimity game vK . Since K is a carrier of vK we can
write using Equality (2):
φT (vK , T ) =
∑
i∈T
∑
S∈ΘT ,i∈S αSϕi
(
vSK
)
k!
with ΘT = {S ⊂ K : T ⊂ S}. Given the definition of ϕi
(
vSK
)
we know that for
each S in Θ different from K, ϕi
(
vSK
)
= 0. Otherwise ϕi
(
vKK
)
= ϕi (vK) =
1
k
and in that case αK = (k − 1)!t. Therefore:
φT (vK , T ) =
∑
i∈T
(k − 1)!t 1k
k!
=
t2
k2
Given that ∀i ∈ K,φi (vK ,K) = ϕi (vK) =
1
k , φT (vK ,K) = ϕT (vK) =
t
k .
Therefore tkφT (vK ,K) =
t2
k2 and Commitment Cost is verified.
Second step: I have now to prove that the function defined in Equalities
(1) and (2) is the unique function which satisfies the four Axioms. Each game
can be written as a linear combination of symmetric games vK (Shapley 1953
lemma 3). Therefore, by Additivity*, it is sufficient to show that the Axioms
allow us to characterize the value for each symmetric game. Consider a sym-
metric game vK and a threshold T . By Efficiency*, since K is a carrier of vK ,∑
i∈K φi (vK , T ) = 1 or φT (vK , T )+φN\K (vK , T ) = 1. By Symmetry*, deduce
that ∀i ∈ T, φi (vK , T ) = φ
∗ (vK , T ) and ∀i ∈ K\T, φi (vK , T ) = φ
∗∗ (vK , T )
and hence:
tφ∗ (vK , T ) + (k − t)φ
∗∗ (vK , T ) = 1
Therefore, by Commitment cost we know that φT (vK , T ) =
t
kφT (vK ,K) =
t
k
1
k and (k − t)φ
∗∗ (vK , T ) = 1− t
t
k
c
k . Therefore:
φi (vK , T ) =
1
k
.
t
k
,∀i ∈ K
φi (vK , T ) =
1
k
(
1 +
t
k
)
,∀i ∈ N\K
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In order to introduce some asymetries in the players’ bargaining weights,
Shapley (1953) proposed the family of weighted Shapley values. Each weighted
Shapley value associates a positive weight with each player. These weights are
the proportions in which the players share in symmetric games. In the case of
the T -value, the weights are determined by the threshold, as described in the
following corollary:
Corollary 1 For a given symmetric game vK and a threshold T ⊂ K, the
T -value generates the weights:
ωi =
t
k2
,∀i ∈ T and ωi =
t+ k
k2
,∀i ∈ K\T
Note that, since
ωj
ωi
= 1+ kt , for each pair (i, j), i ∈ T, j ∈ K\T , the weight of
K\T -members increases with the size of K relative to the size of T . Moreover,
given that k ≥ t ≥ 0, when t = 0 or when t = k, ωi =
1
n ,∀i ∈ N and we are
back in the symmetric case of the Shapley value. Therefore, the non binding
threshold as well as the strongest threshold do not affect the outcome of the
negotiation.
Example 4 Consider the following symmetric game with three players U =
{1, 2, 3} ,
v12 (S) = 1 if 12 ⊂ S
= 0 otherwise
The Shapley value is: ϕ1 (v12) = ϕ2 (v12) =
1
2 ;ϕ3 (v12) = 0. When the threshold
is T = {1} , the T -value is φ1 (v12, {1}) =
1
4 ;φ2 (v12, {1}) =
3
4 ;φ3 (v12, {1}) = 0
Example 5 Weighted majority games are characterized by the existence of
"weights" wi such that it is never the case that
∑
i∈S wi >
∑
N\S wi and such
that (see Shapley (1953) in Roth (1988) p. 39) for each carrier N:
v (S) = n− s if
∑
S
wi >
∑
N\S
wi
v (S) = −s if
∑
S
wi <
∑
N\S
wi
Let us compare v (S) and v (N) − v (N\S) . If v (S) = n − s then v (N\S) =
− (n− s) . Given that v (N) = 0, we deduce that v (S) = v (N)− v (N\S) . As a
consequence, in weighted majority games, whatever the threshold is, the T -value
coincides with the Shapley value.
Kalai and Samet (1987) proposed an axiomatic characterization of the family
of weighted Shapley values introduced by Shapley (1953). They consider that
the weights are associated with an ordered partition of N . Then, the family of
12
weighted Shapley values is characterized by the way the ordered partition and
the associated weights, in other words the weight system, generate a probabilistic
distribution on the orders ofN . One important characteristic of this probabilistic
distribution is that it vanishes on each order which is not consistent with the
ordered partition.
Hart and Kurz (1983) have proposed another value defined for a given coali-
tion structure. But in this case the partition is not ordered and as a consequence,
the CS-value proposed by Hart and Kurz does not satisfy Kalai and Samet’s
Axioms. However, in both cases the coalition structure limits the number of or-
ders to appear. In the CS-value, the only orders to appear are orders consistent
with the coalition structure: the orders in which the coalitions of the structure
appear as blocks. But these blocks can appear in different orders.
In the case of the T -value, the threshold does not modify the probabilistic
distribution on the orders of N , nor eliminate certain orders of N , but it su-
perimposes different orders. To each order of N , corresponds a coalition which
reaches the threshold and this determines two other set of orders: a set of or-
ders of coalition S and a set of orders of coalition N\S. As a consequence, the
T -value is an expected Shapley value.
4 A more general definition of thresholds
The definition of thresholds used in the previous section is rather restrictive.
In this Section, I am going to propose a general definition of thresholds but,
without giving an axiomatization for this general case. Instead, I will discuss
the properties of the function.
Definition 1 A threshold is defined on an interval I ⊂ R+ by a rule which
associates to each threshold level τ ∈ I, a set of coalitions Θ(τ) .
I will say that the coalitions in Θ(τ) satisfy threshold τ. Denote by Θ(τ) the
subset of minimal coalitions in Θ(τ) : Θ (τ) = {S ∈ Θ(τ) ,∄K ∈ Θ(τ) ,K ⊂ S}.
Note that coalitions in Θ(τ) are not necessarily disjoint. The threshold for which
I can give an axiomatization of the T -value is the specific case in which there is
a unique coalition in Θ.
Example 6 The rule which associates with each threshold level τ in the interval
[0; v (N)] , a set of coalitions Θ(τ) = {S : v (S) ≥ τ}.
In what follows, for the simplicity of presentation, Θ(τ) will be called the
threshold. For each given game (N, v) and threshold Θ(τ), the T -value is de-
noted, for each player i ∈ N, by φi (v,Θ(τ)). Is it always the case that the
threshold introduces a bias in the Shapley value? First, note that for a given
rule, the threshold level is not necessary binding. In the previous example, if the
threshold level is so low that each player alone can reach it, Θ(τ) = {S : S ⊂ N},
or if it is so large that the grand coalition is the only coalition that can reach
it, Θ(τ) = {N}, then the T -value coincides with the Shapley value.
φi (v,N) = ϕi (v)
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φi (v, {S : S ⊂ N}) = ϕi (v)
When, whatever the threshold’s level is, the T -value coincides with the Shapley
value, I will say that the rule which defines the threshold is neutral .
Definition 2 A rule which defines a threshold on an interval I is neutral if and
only if ∀τ ∈ I, φi (v,Θ(τ)) = ϕi (v) ,∀i ∈ N .
Now, let us generalize the T -value defined in Section 3 to thresholds as de-
fined in Definition 1. The probabilistic description of thresholds is still available.
Definition 3 For a given game v and a threshold Θ(τ), the T -value for each
player i ∈ N is given by:
φi (v,Θ(τ)) =
∑
S∈Θ(τ),i∈S αSϕi
(
vS
)
+
∑
S∈Θ(τ),i/∈S αSϕi
(
vN\S∗
)
n!
At this point, we can consider the properties of the T -value in this general
case.
Proposition 2 The T -value for any general threshold satisfies Efficiency*, Ad-
ditivity* and Symmetry*.
Proof. Same as before.
What can we say about the Commitment cost in this general context? The
first Proposition of efficiency means that the players share the value of the grand
coalition. But this also means that, if a given player’s T -value is larger than
her Shapley value, in other words if this player benefits from the introduction
of threshold Θ(τ), this occurs at the expense of another player who loses. The
following Proposition, which is a direct consequence of the decomposition of the
Shapley value, shows that this may not always be the case. Indeed, if the rule
that defines the threshold is such that all the coalitions of a given size m˜ reach
the threshold, then, the T -value coincides with the Shapley value.
Proposition 3 Each threshold rule such that ∃m˜ < n and Θ(τ) = Cm˜, is
neutral.
Proof. This is straightforward. If ∃m˜ < n such that Θ(τ) = Cm˜, each order
is associated with a coalition of size m˜ and each coalition M of size m˜ appears
in αM = (n− m˜)!m˜! orders. Therefore, using the decomposition of the Shapley
value we check that:
φi (v,Cm˜) =
(n− m˜)!m˜!
[∑
S∈Ci
m˜
ϕi
(
vS
)
+
∑
S∈C−i
m˜
ϕi
(
vN\S∗
)]
n!
= ϕi (v) .
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An obvious example of threshold rule which does not allow any manipulation
of the Shapley value is a rule defined as a number of players. Indeed, in that
case, the previous Proposition applies and the T -value cannot be different from
the Shapley value.
Corollary 2 The threshold rule which associates to each threshold level τ in
the interval [1;n] , a set of coalitions Θ(τ) = C≥τ is neutral.
Proof. This is a direct consequence of the previous Proposition.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, the T -value is proposed to represent the prospective outcome
or "prospect" of a negotiation when the players’ value can only be realized if a
threshold is reached. The threshold is associated with a minimal coalition T and
it is reached by every coalition that contains T . The analysis conducted in this
paper allows one to deal with many real situations. Consider for example the
case of international negotiations of treaties mentioned in the introduction. The
minimum participation constraint, which is obviously a threshold necessary for
the treaty to be implemented, can be defined in three different ways: as a set of
countries, a number of countries or a level of the global target. In this paper, the
cases I consider in order to define the T -value corresponds to the first definition
of thresholds. Then, the axiomatization reflect the idea that the players who
are needed for the threshold to be reached have to pay a cost for their higher
commitment in the negotiation. In an attempt to extend the definition of the
T -value, I proved that when the threshold is a number of countries, the T -value
coincides with the Shapley value. The extention of the T -value to a general
definition of threshold will be the object of further research.
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6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1:
First, I need to introduce some notation and to make two remarks. Denote
by Cim, C
i
≤m, C
i
>m the sets of coalitions to which player i belongs and of size,
respectively, equal to, smaller than or equal to and larger than m. Therefore:
Ci≤m = ∪
m
k=1C
i
k and C
i
>m = ∪
n
k=m+1C
i
k
On the other hand C−im , C
−i
≤m, C
−i
>m are the sets of coalitions to which player
i does not belong and of size, respectively, equal to, smaller than or equal to
or larger than m . Denote by EiM the set of coalitions included in coalition
M, to which player i belongs: EiM = {S : i ∈ S ⊂M} . Therefore, ∪M∈CimE
i
M
is the set of all coalitions to which player i belongs and which are included in
coalitions of size m. Comparing this set ∪M∈CimE
i
M with the set C
i
≤m we can
make the following remark:
Remark 1 Each coalition S ∈ Ci≤m appears ∁
m−s
n−s =
(n−s)!
(m−s)!(n−m)! times in
∪M∈CimE
i
M .
Example 7 Consider the case in which N = {1, 2, 3}, m = 2 and i = 1. Then,
C1≤2 = {1, 12, 13} and ∪M∈Cm ∪M∈C1m E
1
M = {1, 12, 1, 13} . The singleton {1}
appears once in C1≤2 and twice in ∪M∈C1mE
1
M .
Denote by Ei∗M the set of coalitions S to which player i belongs and in
which M is included: Ei∗M = {S :M ⊂ S, i ∈ S} . Now, comparing C
i
>m and
∪M∈C−im E
i∗
M we can make the second following remark:
Remark 2 Each coalition S ∈ Ci>m appears ∁
m
s−1 =
(s−1)!
m!(s−m−1)! times in ∪M∈C−im E
i∗
M .
Example 8 Consider the case in which N = {1, 2, 3, 4}, m = 2 . Then, C1>2 =
{123, 124, 134, 1234} and ∪M∈C−1m E
1∗
M = E
1∗
23∪E
1∗
24∪E
1∗
34 with E
1∗
23 = {123, 1234},
E1∗24 = {124, 1234}, and E
1∗
34 = {134, 1234}.
For each size of coalition m, we can write:
n!ϕi (v) =
∑
S∈Ci
≤m
(s− 1)! (n− s)! (v (S)− v (S\i))
+
∑
S∈Ci>m
(s− 1)! (n− s)! (v (S)− v (S\i))
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I am going to use the first previous remark in what follows:∑
M∈Cim
m!ϕi
(
vM
)
=
∑
M∈Cim,
∑
S⊂M
i∈S
(s− 1)! (m− s)! (v (S)− v (S\i))
=
∑
S∈∪Ei
M
(s− 1)! (m− s)! (v (S)− v (S\i))
=
∑
S∈Ci
≤m
(s− 1)! (m− s)!
[
(n− s)!
(m− s)! (n−m)!
]
(v (S)− v (S\i))
And therefore: ∑
M∈Cim
ϕi
(
vM
)
=
1
m! (n−m)!
∑
S∈Ci
≤m
(s− 1)! (n− s)! (v (S)− v (S\i)) (3)
The second remark will be used in what follows. First note that ϕi
(
vN\M∗
)
,
which is for each player i ∈ N\M :
ϕi
(
vN\M∗
)
=
∑
S⊂N\M,i∈S (s− 1)! (n−m− s)! (v (S ∪M)− v (S\i ∪M))
(n−m)!
can be written:
ϕi
(
vN\M∗
)
=
∑
S∈Ei∗
M
(s−m− 1)! (n− s)! (v (S)− v (S\i))
(n−m)!
Therefore, using the remark:
(n−m)!
∑
M∈C−im
ϕi
(
vN\M∗
)
=
∑
M∈C−im
∑
S∈Ei∗
M
(s−m− 1)! (n− s)! (v (S)− v (S\i))
=
∑
S∈Ci>m
(s−m− 1)! (n− s)!
[
(s− 1)!
m! (s−m− 1)!
]
(v (S)− v (S\i))
and: ∑
M∈C−im
ϕi
(
vN\M∗
)
(4)
=
1
m! (n−m)!
∑
S∈Ci>m
(n− s)! (s− 1)! (v (S)− v (S\i))
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Finally, adding (4) and (5) gives:
m! (n−m)!

 ∑
M∈Cim
ϕi
(
vM
)
+
∑
M∈C−im
ϕi
(
vN\M∗
)
=
∑
S∈Ci
≤m
(s− 1)! (n− s)! (v (S)− v (S\i))
+
∑
S∈Ci>m
(n− s)! (s− 1)! (v (S)− v (S\i))
= n!ϕi (v)
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